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Abstract  
As organizations increasingly rely on professionally oriented networks such as LinkedIn (the largest 
such social network) for building business connections, there is increasing value in having one’s 
profile noticed within the network. As this value increases, so does the temptation to misuse the 
network for unethical purposes. Fake profiles have an adverse effect on the trustworthiness of the 
network as a whole, and can represent significant costs in time and effort in building a connection 
based on fake information. Unfortunately, fake profiles are difficult to identify. Approaches have been 
proposed for some social networks; however, these generally rely on data that are not publicly 
available for LinkedIn profiles. In this research, we identify the minimal set of profile data necessary 
for identifying fake profiles in LinkedIn, and propose an appropriate data mining approach for fake 
profile identification. We demonstrate that, even with limited profile data, our approach can identify 
fake profiles with 87% accuracy and 94% True Negative Rate, which is comparable to the results 
obtained based on larger data sets and more expansive profile information.  Further, when compared 
to approaches using similar amounts and types of data, our method provides an improvement of 
approximately 14% accuracy. 
 
Keywords: LinkedIn, Fake Profile, Neural Network, Weighted Average, Support Vector Machine, 
Principle Component Analysis, Data mining. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, social networks have had a dramatic impact on human social interactions, changing 
the web into a social web where users and their communities are centres for online growth, commerce, 
and information sharing [1]. Social networks each offer unique value chains targeting different user 
segments. Users find old friends perusing Facebook, and receive fast updates and breaking news 
through Twitter. LinkedIn is designed to support professional communities, where users maintain a 
profile with a high degree of personal contacts, and search for contacts with desired skills. Measured 
by usage rates, Facebook is the most-visited social network with 800 million visitors per month; 
Twitter is the second most-visited social network with 250 million visitors per month. LinkedIn has 
the third-highest visit rate, with more than 200 million visitors per month, and serves as the world’s 
largest professional network [2]. 
The surge of social networks’ popularity, combined with the availability of large amounts of 
information posted by users, from email addresses to personal information and messages, make users 
attractive targets for malicious entities. Most attacks focus on retrieving user information without user 
consent. Typically, an attacker will create a fake profile, and then solicit a connection to the intended 
victim. If the target accepts the connection, the attacker then has access to the target’s full profile, 
which would otherwise be accessible only to trusted contacts [3]. Further, each victim “connection” a 
fake profile can attract can serve to increase the profile’s surface legitimacy, which can help to attract 
further connections. 
According to Cloudmark estimates, between 20% and 40% of Facebook and Twitter accounts could be 
fake profiles [4]. Due to the high levels of user interaction and the millions of daily transactions, 
separating suspicious users from legitimate ones is increasingly difficult. Efforts to solicit user 
assistance in flagging fake profiles have not achieved the results expected [5]. Further, in networks 
with strict user privacy policies, little data is publicly available, making it difficult to distinguish 
between fake and legitimate profiles in a systematic way before deciding whether to trust a potential 
connection. In this work, we propose a method for differentiating between legitimate and fake profiles 
in a methodical manner, based on limited publicly available profile information in sites with restrictive 
privacy policies, such as LinkedIn. 
 
1.1 Background                                                                                                                                                                
A typical social network profile consists of two main parts, static data and dynamic data. Static data 
refers to slowly changing or unchanging information that the user enters into the system, while 
dynamic data refers to information describing the user’s activity on the social network. The set of 
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static data typically includes a user’s demographics and interests, while dynamic data relates to user 
activities, connections, and position in the social network [6]. 
A fake profile is a social network profile that maintains a forged identity purporting to be someone 
other than the person who created it, or containing fictitious personal information. Krombholz, Merkl 
[7] observed that user behavior on fake profiles is different from that of legitimate users. There are 
three significant ways of creating fake social network profiles. First, a legitimate user may fabricate 
the content in his own profile [7] in order to manipulate the appeal of his profile [8, 9]. Second, a user 
may clone the profile of another legitimate user [10, 11] by creating a similar profile in the same or 
another social network by copying the victim’s profile and adding victim’s friends into the new fake 
profile. Third, a user may create a profile with a fabricated identity [7] in order to attain victims’ trust 
and confidence, and then collect their confidential information. Because the features of legitimate and 
fake profiles are very similar on the surface, it is difficult to distinguish between them without a 
reliable method for using the available data for differentiation purposes. 
Figure 1 shows two sample fake profiles:  the profile on the left contains data that does not make sense 
together, while the profile on the right shows two profiles with the same photo, but slightly different 
content. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Examples for LinkedIn fake profiles: on the left, a bot-generated profile [12]; on the right, 
two profiles with the same photo and different name [13] 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The focus of this research is to develop a method for recognizing and differentiating legitimate 
profiles and fake profiles in LinkedIn. LinkedIn is the most prominent professional social network, 
supporting the management of users’ digital resumes.  In this network, users can list biographical data, 
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professional history, and maintain a list of professional contacts. The concentration of professional 
information on a single platform has created a valuable repository of professional information of 
interest to a variety of stakeholders.  For instance, there is a significant trend in using LinkedIn for 
recruiting and job searching – recruitment agents can select potential workers and users can identify 
and contact potential employers. These activities have actual monetary value, which has attracted the 
notice of malicious users and increased the rate of fake profile creation.  For example, in early 2014, a 
group of hackers executed a Botnet attack and created thousands of fake LinkedIn profiles [14]. 
Currently, the identification of fake profiles in LinkedIn is limited to a manual reporting process, 
where a user can flag a suspected fake profile.  
 
Virtually all current research approaches proposed for identifying fake profiles depend on both static 
and dynamic data, and are based on either Facebook or Twitter. Both of these social networks provide 
rich Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to provide relevant, real-time, and up-to-date user 
information supporting the research requirements. The Facebook API [15] facilitates access to a wide 
variety of both static and dynamic profile information, including user activities, friends’ activities, 
friends of friends, and basic biographical details (including age, birthday, profile status, relationship 
status, likes, groups details, etc.). Similarly, the Twitter API [16] provides twitter counts, followers, 
notifications, friends, and basic user details. In contrast, LinkedIn has much stricter privacy policies, 
with limited public visibility for static profile information, and no access to dynamic profile details. 
Due to these stringent privacy policies [17], it is difficult, if not impossible, to apply existing practical 
and theoretical approaches for fake profile detection. In this research, our goal is to identify an 
approach to distinguish legitimate profiles and fake profiles in LinkedIn, based only on limited 
publicly accessible profile information.  
 
In order to carry out this project, we needed a set of fake profiles to serve as a comparison data set.  
Most current research in this area uses simulated fake profiles for this purpose.  While this is a valid 
methodology, it has the potential to either over-emphasize expected characteristics of fake profiles, or 
omit characteristics that exist in real-world fake profiles. Ideally, we would like to work with a set of 
known fake LinkedIn profiles, which would avoid the potential issues associated with simulated data. 
We were able to find a set of web sources that provide lists of verified fake LinkedIn fake profiles that 
have been manually identified and checked, which allowed us to use verified fake profile data for our 
research.  
 
In this research, we applied four data mining techniques, Neural Network (NN), Support Vector 
Machine (SVM), Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Weighted Average (WA) for fake profile 
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identification, in several combinations, to determine which combination of techniques produces the 
most accurate differentiation between fake and legitimate profiles. Our results show that our approach 
performs with an accuracy of 84% and false negative of 2.44%. This is comparable to the results 
reported by existing research, where the results are based on much more expansive profile data than 
we consider in our research. Further, when compared to approaches using similar amounts and types 
of data, our method provides an improvement of approximately 14% in accuracy. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of existing research 
related to LinkedIn, as well as prior research on fake profile identification. Section 3 describes the 
LinkedIn dataset and the process followed to collect the data. Section 4 describes our experimental 
method and results. Section 5 discusses the experimental results and their implications. Section 6 
identifies the limitations of the study and discusses future directions for our research.  Section 7 
concludes our discussion of this study. 
2 RELATED WORK 
In this section, we provide an overview of existing research on the LinkedIn network and fake social 
network profile identification.  
2.1 Research based on LinkedIn data 
To date, little research has been carried out using LinkedIn as the primary data source. Hsieh, Tiwari 
[18] analysed LinkedIn profiles to understand the probability of connections between two people 
based on their organizational overlap. Xiang, Neville [19] considered interaction activity and 
similarity of user profiles to develop an unsupervised model to estimate friendship strength using 
proprietary data from LinkedIn. 
2.2 Detecting fake profiles 
Current research describes a number of different strategies that have been developed for identifying 
fake social network profiles. Much of the literature reports the application of these strategies applied in 
different contexts (e.g., in different social networks, or on different feature sets). Here, we describe a 
set of exemplars of these strategies. 
2.2.1 In LinkedIn 
Kontaxis, Polakis [11] proposed an approach for detecting cloned profiles based on LinkedIn data. 
While this is similar in spirit to our research, the actual research questions addressed are quite different.  
In the Kontaxis approach, the research study asks the following question:  “Given a known legitimate 
profile on LinkedIn, can clones of that profile be accurately identified?”  The authors propose a 
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method that compares candidate clone profiles to a known legitimate profile to predict whether the 
target profile is a clone or not.  In contrast, in our study here, we consider as input a LinkedIn profile 
whose status as fake or legitimate is unknown, and attempt to determine whether the profile is fake or 
legitimate, based solely on the publicly available content in the profile.  
Kontaxis, Polakis [11] artificially induced fake cloned profile to demonstrate the efficacy of their 
approach. Additionally the number of fake profiles introduced is also just ten.  Whereas in this 
research, we have relied on actual fake profiles reported in other sources and we have considered 34 
such fake profiles. 
2.2.2 In other social networks  
Fire, Katz [3] used topology anomalies to identify spammers and fake profiles. They incorporated 
graph theory, supervised learning, parallel decision trees, and Naïve Bayes classifiers into their 
algorithm. Boshmaf, Muslukhov [20] adopted the traditional web-based Botnet design to build a group 
of adaptive social-bots as a socialbot network and analyzed its impact via millions of Facebook users. 
Jin, Takabi [10] analyzed the behavior of identity clone attacks and proposed a detection framework. 
Cao, Sirivianos [8] ranked users in online services to detect fake accounts. Their ranking algorithm is 
supported by social graphs according to the degree-normalized probability of a short random walk 
residing in the non-Sybil region. In a case study research, Krombholz, Merkl [7] analyzed privacy-
related issues in social media contexts by creating desirable fake Facebook profiles and interacting 
with existing legitimate users, and documenting the information that could be harvested and analyzed 
from the users who interact with these fake profiles.  
Chakraborty, Sundi [21] proposed an approach for detecting spam posts in Twitter using SVM. Lee, 
Eoff [4] developed a method to identify spam posters in Twitter using a Random Forest approach. 
Other past research [22, 23, 24] have also proposed approaches that rely on Twitter and Facebook 
posts, which are not available in Linkedin. Though the underlying tools used in all these studies are 
different, all heavily rely on actual twitter posts, i.e., on dynamic data. In the Linkedin case, the 
features for posting news and status are not commonly used by most Linkedin users (only 4% 
Linkedin users use Linkedin posting functionality [25], so any method that relies heavily on posting 
behavior cannot be directly used for fake profile detection in Linkedin.  
Feizy, Wakeman [26] developed approach for determining fake profiles in MySpace based on profile 
data. However, they rely on more detailed data such as a profile’s network connections and mutual 
friendships, which are not available in Linkedin unless the target user is directly connected. 
Additionally, Feizy, Wakeman [26] relied on fake profiles developed manually to demonstrate the 
efficacy of their approach. Obviously, generating artificial fake profiles creates the possibility of bias 
in the generation process, and does not demonstrate the capability of the proposed approach on real 
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fake profiles. Similar to Feizy, Wakeman [26], Conti, Poovendran [27] developed an approach to 
detect fake Facebook profile using a graph-based network of Facebook friends. However, their 
approach also relies on artificially-generated fake profiles to demonstrate utility of the approach. 
Moreover, they assume that the fake profiles are within the network, and so more information (such as 
the target user’s connection list) is available about these profiles.   
In summary, our proposed approach differs in two dimensions from the existing approaches and thus 
provides a significant contribution in this stream of research. First, our approach identifies the 
minimum set of profile data to determine fakeness with high accuracy without requiring access to 
private data or dynamic posting behavior. Second, our approach considers verified fake profiles from 
existing known sources, rather then simulated profiles. We have used these fake profiles to 
demonstrate the applicability and accuracy of our approach.   
 
3 LINKEDIN DATASET 
For this study, we identified a data set consisting of both fake and legitimate LinkedIn profiles.  In this 
section, we describe the process we followed to build our experimental dataset, including both fake 
profiles and legitimate profiles. 
We identified the fake profiles in our dataset based on the existing evidence online, using LinkedIn 
profiles that have been investigated and declared to be fake by different sources in the internet. To 
identify such fake profiles, we searched blogs and web sites, and we were able to collect 34 fake 
Linkedin profiles. (Some profiles were identified by several sources.) The details of these fake profiles, 
along with their respective sources, are listed in the Appendix 1. This selection process is based on 
entirely on known available fake profiles, and we included all of the fake profiles that we could find in 
the dataset.  
To identify legitimate profiles, we randomly selected 40 people affiliated with a major international 
university in Asia, and asked each of them to provide the public LinkedIn URL for a known legitimate 
profile in their network. Through this process, we collected 40 legitimate LinkedIn profiles. This 
process ensured randomness in the selection of these profiles.  
For all profiles, we collected only the public URL, and did not create any connection link with these 
profiles. This ensures that we have access only to publicly available information. 
Table 1 lists all the profile features we were able to capture publicly for both the legitimate and fake 
profiles, along with the maximum and average values of each profile feature across all profiles in our 
dataset. Due to LinkedIn restrictions, invariant of the number of connections or skills a profile might 
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contain, the number of connections available publicly is limited to 500 and the number of skills 
available publicly is limited to 50. Therefore, rather than computing the normalized values via mean 
and standard deviation, we normalized the values by the maximum and minimum value of each feature. 
Since each profile feature value is absent at least once in either a legitimate or a fake profile, the 
minimum value for all features is 0. The maximum and average values are shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1:  Details of the profile features 
 
For analysis purposes, we developed three data sets (Dataset 1, Dataset 2, Dataset 3), each consisting 
of all 74 profiles in the overall LinkedIn data set.  Within each data set, we randomly assigned half of 
the legitimate profiles (20 profiles) and half of the fake profiles (17 profiles) as a training data set, and 
assigned the other half as a test data set.  
To demonstrate that the three datasets are truly randomly selected, we present the statistical 
significance of the each test dataset with respect to complete data in Table 2. 
The statistical significance test is carried out using two sample tests along with Levene's Test for 
equality of variances. When the Sig-value of Levene's test is >0.05 [28], we conclude that the mean 
and variance of two groups are the same, and thus the dataset is true representative of the complete 
data. As shown in Table 2, each feature has a higher Sig value (>0.05) across all three datasets. Thus, 
each dataset is a representation of the complete set at 5% significance level. 
 
 
Profile feature 
Maximum 
value 
Average 
value 
Description 
No_Languages 5 0.347 Number of languages spoken 
Profile_Summary 1 0.52 Presence of profile summary 
No_Edu_Qualification 7 1.467 Number of education qualifications attained 
No_Connections 500 294.867 Number of connections to other profiles 
No_Recommendation 37 2 Number of recommendations made 
Web_Site_URL 1 0.28 Presence of a URL for personal web site 
No_Skills 50 10.213 Number of skills and expertise listed 
No_Professions 16 3.08 Number of past and present professions listed 
Profile_Image 1 0.76 Presence of a profile image 
No_Awards 10 0.56 Number of awards won 
Interests 1 0.267 Presence of any type of interests 
No_LinkedIn_Groups 51 8.907 Number of LinkedIn groups and associations added 
No_Publications 16 0.613 Number of publications listed 
No_Projects 7 0.24 Number of work projects listed 
No_Certificates 9 0.267 Number of certificates held 
  
9 
 
 
  Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3 
 t Sig. t Sig. t Sig. 
No_Languages 1.128 .262 -.993 .323 -.290 .773 
Profile_Summary -.347 .729 .400 .690 .531 .597 
No_Edu_Qualifications -.972 .333 1.194 .235 1.652 .109 
No_Connections 1.113 .268 -1.289 .200 -.066 .948 
No_Recommendations .147 .883 -.161 .872 .056 .955 
Web_Site_URL -.639 .524 .774 .441 -.063 .950 
No_Skills .575 .566 -.629 .531 .345 .731 
No_Professions -.138 .891 .164 .870 -.029 .977 
Profile_Image .294 .769 -.348 .728 .228 .820 
No_Awards -.415 .679 .504 .615 -.521 .604 
Interests .151 .880 -.172 .864 -.073 .942 
No_LinkedIn_Groups .093 .926 -.098 .922 .449 .654 
No_Publications -.134 .894 .157 .876 .125 .901 
No_Projects 1.809 .074 -1.074 .285 -.182 .856 
No_Certificates .895 .373 -.828 .410 .861 .391 
Legitimacy .289 .773 -.335 .738 -.121 .904 
Table 2:  Statistical significance of datasets 
 
4 METHOD AND RESULTS 
In this research, we applied four well-known data mining techniques, Neural network (NN), Support 
vector machine (SVM), Principal component analysis (PCA) and Weighted average (WA) to the 
problem of fake profile identification in LinkedIn. Typically, social network research (including spam 
message identification, profile cloning and intruder detection) employs NN and SVM as the principal 
mining techniques.  PCA is generally applied to reduce the number of dimensions of the datasets [29], 
and WA is used as a supportive implementation for optimizing results in the other data mining 
techniques [30, 31]. While we build on current methods in this work, we use WA as an independent 
solution to classify the data, rather than as a method for optimizing results. 
 
In this section, we describe our proposed approach.  Specifically, we explain how each technique is 
used in the process of data mining to differentiate legitimate and fake profiles. The process has three 
main mining steps. In the first step, we extract profile features using PCA. In the second step, we use 
three independent methods, NN, SVM and WA, to predict fake and legitimate profiles. NN and SVM 
follow a training-testing approach, while WA uses feature weights to generate a profile index for 
prediction. In the third step, we calculate accuracy rates across NN, SVM, and WA to compare the 
techniques (see Figure 2). For this research, we define accuracy as follows:  
 
% 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠, 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠
×  100 
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Figure 2:  Design approach to calculate accuracy rates for data mining techniques 
Moreover, for each analysis True Positive Rate (TPR) and True Negative Rate (TNR) were calculated 
through the false positive and false negative values.  We define TPR and TNR as follows, where the 
term “false positive” refers to the number of fake profiles identified as legitimate profiles, and the term 
“false negative” refers to the number of legitimate profiles identified as fake profiles:  
 
𝑇𝑃𝑅 =
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠)
 
 
𝑇𝑁𝑅 =
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠)
  
 
In the remainder of this section, we first describe the feature selection process using PCA, which 
determines which features will be used as input to the NN, SVM, and WA mining methods.  We then 
describe the mining process using each of the mining methods (NN, SVM, and WA), and finally 
present the accuracy results for each method, both with and without PCA feature selection. Table 3 
describes the major notation used in this work. 
 
𝑷 Profile set 
𝒑 Index for profile 𝒑 = 𝟏, … . , |𝑷| 
𝑭 Feature set 
𝒇 Index for feature 𝑓 = 1, … . , |𝐹| 
𝑹 Set of selected principal components 
𝑺𝒇𝒓 Score of feature 𝑓 in the principal component 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 
𝒗𝒇𝒑 A feature value of a feature 𝑓 in a profile 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 
𝑽𝒇 Total feature value of a feature 𝑓 for all profiles in 𝑃 
𝑨𝒇 Average value of a feature 𝑓 across all profiles in 𝑃 
𝒄𝒇𝒑 Binary indicative variable indicating whether feature 𝑓 is present in profile 𝑝 
Profiles 
Feature 
selection 
SVM 
Model 
Training 
Feature 
Weights 
Model 
Testing 
Profile 
Index 
Model 
Accuracies 
Accuracy 
Comparison 
NN SVM NN 
WA WA 
PCA 
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𝑪𝒇 Number of profiles in P where feature 𝑓 is present 
𝒘𝒇 Weight of feature 𝑓 
𝑵𝒇 Normalized feature count of a feature 𝑓 
𝑾𝒑 Weight of a profile 𝑝  
Table 3:  Notation for symbols 
 
4.1 Feature selection through Principal Component Analysis 
In this research study, we use PCA for dimensionality reduction, i.e., to determine which profile 
features best explain the variance in the data set, and therefore should be considered in the data mining 
process. While there are a number of different mathematical methods for deriving PCA results, we 
used variance maximization, one of the simplest PCA methods.  
In variance maximization, we successively identify the first principal component, i.e., the component 
that has the highest projection variance, which accounts for the greatest variance across the data set.  
We then consider the remaining variance to identify the next principal component.  We continue this 
process for all features in the data set.    
To ensure the sampling adequacy, we tested for Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett’s Test. The 
resulting KMO value was 0.724, which is higher than the acceptable level of 0.5. The results of 
Barlett's test are significant at p<0.05 [32]. This verifies that there are sufficient samples to proceed 
with the study. 
We considered both fake and legitimate profiles in the process of calculating the variance score for 
each of the features. We used Eigen-decomposition, the most commonly-used calculation method for 
PCA, to find the number of components. Eigenvalues provide information about the variability in the 
data.  We estimated the variation of the components and selected the components with Eigenvalues 
greater than 1 [33].  There we found 5 components, which account for 64.82% of the total variance. 
The component variations and their Eigenvalues are shown in Table 4.  
We then checked each component feature score, which provides information about the structure of the 
observations, to identify features that either load into several components with a score value greater 
than 0.5, or do not load into any component with a score value greater than 0.5 [33]. In order to better 
understand the relationship between these features and extracted principal components, we used 
Varimax rotation to reload the features into the components, and found that some features still load 
into several components without acceptable score values. We iteratively removed these features and 
re-ran the PCA based feature selection process until there were no more features to remove. This 
approach for feature reduction is described in algorithmic format in Algorithm 1.  
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Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.375 29.170 29.170 
2 1.801 12.008 41.177 
3 1.290 8.601 49.778 
4 1.195 7.970 57.748 
5 1.061 7.075 64.823 
6 .934 6.225 71.049 
7 .840 5.603 76.652 
8 .820 5.464 82.116 
9 .618 4.119 86.234 
10 .522 3.479 89.714 
11 .440 2.936 92.650 
12 .369 2.462 95.111 
13 .284 1.891 97.002 
14 .242 1.611 98.613 
15 .208 1.387 100.000 
Table 4:  Total variance explained by PCA 
Based on the results of Algorithm 1, we removed the following features: Profile_Image, No_Awards, 
No_LinkedIn_Groups and No_Publications. As shown in Table 5, the remaining features load into 
four components with a total variation of 66.15%.  The KMO value is lower, 0.655, but is still higher 
than the recommended threshold (>0.5) with the same significance value.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 1:  Feature reduction through PCA 
Input: F, set of all features 
Initialize each Zf  to zero, where Zf  is an binary variable associated to feature f 
Do 
 Run PCA with Varimax rotation 
 If (Eigenvalue ≥ 1) 
  Select R, where R is the set of selected principal components 
  Initialize L to empty, where L is a list 
  For each f ϵ F 
   For each r ϵ R 
    If Sfr > 0.5, where Sfr is feature scores for feature f 
     Zf= Zf+1  
   End For 
   If Zf  is not equal to 1 
    Add f  to L 
   End If 
  End For 
 End If 
 For Each 𝑓 ∈   𝐿 
  Remove f from F  
While (L length > 0) 
Output: F is the set of selected feature set  
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Table 5:  PCA-selected feature loadings 
To further clarify the independence across the selected features, we show the correlation matrix for the 
selected features in Table 6.   
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] 
[1]  1.000           
[2]  0.261 1.000          
[3]  0.311 0.379 1.000         
[4]  0.287 0.296 0.624 1.000        
[5]  0.161 0.236 0.259 0.237 1.000       
[6]  0.155 0.061 0.177 0.266 0.659 1.000      
[7]  0.095 0.169 0.105 0.340 0.036 -0.053 1.000     
[8]  0.120 0.251 0.021 0.205 0.161 0.141 0.278 1.000    
[9]  0.502 0.317 0.319 0.448 0.406 0.331 0.465 0.516 1.000   
[10]  0.132 0.153 0.206 0.207 0.075 0.091 0.188 0.132 0.270 1.000  
[11]  -0.065 -0.034 0.123 0.156 -0.090 -0.054 0.101 0.136 0.120 0.319 1.000 
Table 6:  Correlation matrix for selected features 
Table 6 shows that almost all of the correlations are less than 0.6.  Two combinations (features [3] and 
[4], and features [5] and [6]) have values are marginally higher than 0.6. However, in both cases, the 
two features load into the same component: both feature [3] and feature [4] load into component 1, and 
features [5] and [6] load into component 2 (Table 3). Therefore, we can state that the selected features 
are not highly correlated to each another [34, 35]. We summarize the results of the PCA-based feature 
selection step in Table 6.   
 
Feature 
No. 
Profile Feature Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4 
[1]  No_Languages 0.614 0.098 0.218 -0.162 
[2]  Profile_Summary        0.623 0.016 0.247 -0.097 
[3]  No_Edu_Qualifications 0.827 0.139 -0157 0.266 
[4]  No_Professions        0.702 0.171 0.153 0.311 
[5]  Web_Site_URL           0.195 0.860 0.106 -0.046 
[6]  Interests           0.079 0.913 0.025 0.040 
[7]  No_Connections      0.208 -.0177 0.684 0.157 
[8]  No_Recommendations -0.007 0.161 0.800 0.076 
[9]  No_Skills              0.426 0.335 0.695 0.122 
[10]  No_Projects        0.164 0.072 0.154 0.685 
[11]  No_Certificates  -0.075 -0.082 0.077 0.843 
Feature Name Is Selected by PCA?  ( Y – Yes, N – No) Selected Feature Number 
No_Languages Y [1] 
Profile_Summary Y [2] 
No_Edu_Qualification Y [3] 
No_Connections Y [4] 
No_Recommendation Y [5] 
Web_Site_URL Y [6] 
No_Skills Y [7] 
No_Professions Y [8] 
Profile_Image N  
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Table 7:  List of selected and all profile features 
4.2 Neural Network mining  
Currently, there are many Neural Network (NN) algorithms designed to train models through 
supervised learning or unsupervised learning. In this research, we are interested in supervised learning, 
where the selected profile features (Table 7) serve as input, and predicted legitimacy is the response 
variable.  We selected the Resilient backpropagation (Rprop) algorithm as the base algorithm for NN 
mining. Rprop does not account for the magnitude of the partial derivatives of the patterns (only the 
sign) and works independently on each weight [36]. Rprop is considered to be one of the fastest 
algorithms in data mining [37]. We selected the neuralnet package (an implementation of Rprop) in 
the R project for statistical computing [38]. Neuralnet is flexible, allowing for the selection of custom-
choice of error-function, the number of covariates with response variables, and the number of hidden 
layers with hidden neurons. 
Since the response variable (legitimacy of the profile) is binary (if legitimate, then the value is 1; if 
fake, the value is 0), we chose the logistic function (default) as the activation function of the training, 
and cross-entropy (err.fct=“ce”) as the error function. To ensure that the output is mapped by the 
activation function to the interval [0, 1], we defined linear.output as FALSE [38]. With this 
preparation, we trained the model by determining the number of hidden neurons and layers in relation 
to the optimized results. After several iterations, the best result (with the highest accuracy) is achieved 
with one hidden layer with two neurons.  
First, we trained the model for all three datasets with all of the original features (i.e., including the 
features identified for removal in the PCA step) and saved their models in different variables. We then 
ran the same process for each dataset after removing the features identified for removal in the PCA 
step, and saved the models to different variables. Figure 3 shows an example of how covariate, 
response variables and hidden neurons are linked with calculated weights in the result model for 
Dataset 3 for the PCA-selected features.  
We used the “compute” function of the library to predict results for new data based on the stored NN 
models. Since the compute function automatically redefines the NN structure only to calculate the 
output for arbitrary covariates, we could easily determine the predictions for the legitimacy of each of 
the test datasets, both with all features and with PCA-selected features. We then compared the 
No_Awards N  
Interests Y [9] 
No_LinkedIn_Groups N  
No_Publications N  
No_Projects Y [10] 
No_Certificates Y [11] 
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predicted results with the actual legitimacy values (i.e., whether the profile is actually fake or 
legitimate) and calculated the accuracy for each dataset with all features and with PCA-selected 
features.  These results are shown in Table 8.  
 
Figure 3:  NN plot for training model of Dataset 3 with PCA-selected features 
Table 8 shows that the TPR, TNR and accuracy results are higher for the PCA-selected features case 
as compared to the results when all features are used. When all features are considered, the model 
deteriorates due to the inclusion of unnecessary data points, which leads to over-fitting, and lower 
accuracy. This clearly demonstrates the importance of including the PCA step in our approach if NN is 
used for determining the legitimacy of a LinkedIn profile.  
  Dataset 
Training 
error 
TPR TNR 
Accuracy 
(%) 
All 
features 
Dataset 1 0.043 0.79 0.93 84.85 
Dataset 2 0.083 0.62 0.75 68.29 
Dataset 3 0.064 0.74 0.92 86.11 
Average 0.063 0.72 0.87 79.75 
Selected 
Features 
Dataset 1 0.025 0.79 1.00 87.88 
Dataset 2 0.089 0.67 0.85 70.73 
Dataset 3 0.012 0.89 0.88 89.89 
  Average 0.042 0.78 0.91 82.83 
Table 8:  Accuracy results obtained through Neural Network training 
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4.3 Support Vector Machine mining 
In this section, we describe how we applied a second supervised learning technique, a Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) based approach, to identify fake profiles. To develop an SVM training model, we 
applied C-support vector classification (C-svc) which is a Quadratical Programming (QP) solution. C-
svc identifies the best possible hyperplane by measuring the margin between two classes using 2-norm 
of the normal vector and norm-1 is used for feature selection within the SVM method [39]. (This 
refers to feature selection within SVM, which is different from the PCA-based feature selection 
described in Section 4.1). According to Mercer’s theorem [40], the kernel function K can be 
considered as equal to a dot-product in input space. Due to the nonlinearity of the profile features, 
SVM is able to create a random decision function in the input space on the kernel function.  
 
We used both the Radial Basis function (RBF) kernel and Polynomial kernel as kernel functions in 
order to better understand the performance of SVM on our dataset.  
 
We selected the RBF kernel because it uses the heuristic in sigest to calculate better sigma values, and 
we did not need to assign values to the kernel parameters.  The Radial basis function kernel K can be 
written as  
  𝐾(𝑋𝑖 , 𝑋𝑗) =  𝑒
𝛾|𝑋𝑖−𝑋𝑗|
2
 
 
We selected the Polynomial kernel because it uses combinations of features of the input sample 
instead of determining their similarity independently.  The Polynomial kernel function can be written 
as, 
  𝐾(𝑋𝑖 , 𝑋𝑗) =  (−𝛾𝑋𝑖 ∙ 𝑋𝑗 + 𝐶)
𝑑
 
 
When C=0, the kernel is called homogenous. 
For both kernels, 𝐾(𝑋𝑖 , 𝑋𝑗) =  𝜑(𝑋𝑖) ∙ 𝜑(𝑋𝑗); 𝛾 = −
1
2𝜎2
 
The transformation function 𝜑 maps a dot product of input data points into a higher dimensional 
feature space where the non-linear patterns demonstrate linearity. γ is a parameter and γ >0. 
 
We used KSVM (function of R, kernlab package), an implementation of a C-svc classifier, to train the 
SVM model. KSVM uses the Sequential Minimal Optimization (SMO) algorithm for solving the SVM 
quadratic programming (QP) optimization problem [41]. We generated the training models with the 
two proposed kernel functions (RBF and Polynomial) to create SVM models for all three training 
datasets, both with all features and with only PCA-selected features. We then tested the models using 
the test datasets. In this way we have total 12 models (2 Kernel functions, 3 datasets – each with both 
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all features and PCA-selected features) to test and compare. We tested each with the appropriate test 
dataset, and calculated the Accuracy, TPR, and TNR rates. The consolidated results are presented in 
the Table 9.  
 
  
  
RBF kernel  Polynomial kernel  
  
Dataset TPR TNR 
Accuracy 
(%) 
TPR TNR 
Accuracy 
(%) 
All 
features 
Dataset 1 0.63 0.87 78.79 0.79 0.92 84.85 
Dataset 2 0.68 0.76 70.03 0.81 0.78 73.17 
Dataset 3 0.79 0.92 88.89 0.89 1.00 91.67 
Average 0.70 0.85 79.24 0.83 0.90 83.23 
Selected 
features 
Dataset 1 0.68 0.86 75.76 0.82 0.95 89.85 
Dataset 2 0.75 0.85 78.05 0.81 0.87 75.61 
Dataset 3 0.82 0.94 91.67 0.97 1.00 96.56 
  Average 0.75 0.88 81.83 0.87 0.94 87.34 
Table 9:  Accuracy results obtained through Support Vector Machine training 
 
In each of the scenarios, the Polynomial kernel delivered optimized results with fewer vectors in 
comparison to the Radial Basis Kernel. Since we need to compute the dot product of each support 
vector with the test point, the computational complexity of the model is linear to the number of 
support vectors.  
 
Table 9 shows that the Polynomial Kernel performs better than the Radial Basis kernel in all cases, 
both with all features and with only PCA-selected features. For all three metrics, TPR, TNR and 
Accuracy, the case of the Polynomial Kernel with PCA-selected features provides the strongest results.  
 
From Table 9 we also note that the TNR is higher than the TPR, indicating the approach is more 
successful in identifying a fake profile as a fake profile, than identifying legitimate profile as a 
legitimate profile. This is important in the LinkedIn scenario, which is the focus of our research, 
because false negatives carry greater risks than false positives. Consider an employer who pursues a 
potential candidate employee identified through LinkedIn, only to realize in middle or later stages of 
the process that the candidate’s profile in Linkedin is fake.  In this scenario, the organization has 
devoted resources in an unnecessary recruitment cycle, wasting the organization’s valuable time and 
financial resources.  
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Based on the above SVM discussion, we conclude that the Polynomial kernel applied on PCA-selected 
profile features provides the highest accuracy for identifying fake profiles, with the lowest percentage 
of false negatives across all SVM cases. 
4.4 Weighted Average mining 
As a third mining alternative, we analyzed the dataset through a Weighted Average (WA) calculation 
of profile feature vectors, and then estimated the legitimate profiles index. During this process, we first 
derived the average value for each feature (normalized to a (0…1) range), based on all the legitimate 
profiles.  
 
The total feature value can be computed as follows: 
𝑉𝑓 =  ∑ 𝑣𝑓𝑝
𝑝
 
And feature average:  𝐴𝑓 =  𝑉𝑓 |𝑃|⁄  
We also count the number of times a feature is present in a legitimate profile as, 
𝑐𝑓𝑝 =  {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑣𝑓𝑝 > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑣𝑓𝑝 = 0
  
Then the total feature count for all the profiles is        
𝐶𝑓 =  ∑ 𝑐𝑓𝑝
𝑝
 
     
For example, the average value for number of connections in a legitimate profile is 0.741 and the total 
feature count is 39. Table 10 shows the average value of each feature and its total count. Based on 
these two values we created a feature weight as: 
𝑤𝑓 =  𝐴𝑓𝑁𝑓  
 
where, normalized feature count is, 
𝑁𝑓 =  
𝐶𝑓 − 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑓 (𝐶𝑓) 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑓 (𝐶𝑓) −  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑓 (𝐶𝑓)
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Table 10:  Feature count and weight for all features 
In the next step, we derived a profile weight 𝑊𝑝 (for both fake and legitimate profiles) for each profile 
for all three test datasets using the feature weights.         
𝑊𝑝 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑓𝑣𝑓𝑝
𝑓
 
                  
We then estimated the profile index I for each dataset by averaging all the profile weights of a 
particular dataset.  The profile index is, 
𝐼 =  
∑ 𝑊𝑝𝑝
|𝑃|
 
We calculated profile indices for each dataset for both all features and the PCA-selected features. We 
then compared the profile weight of each profile in each dataset with the respective profile indexes. If 
the profile weight is greater than the profile index, then we predict that the profile is legitimate; if it is 
less, then we predict that the profile is fake. Table 11 shows the accuracy of the results for each dataset 
for all features and PCA-selected features, along with the respective profile index for each case.  The 
results in Table 11 demonstrate that WA performs better for the PCA-selected feature cases than the 
all features case for Dataset 1 and Dataset 3; however, for Dataset 2, WA performs much better for the 
all features case as compared to the PCA-selected feature case. We could not find any reason for this 
behaviour other than reduced reliability using WA for such detection. Similar to the SVM case, in this 
scenario TNR is higher than TPR, indicating the approach is more successful in identifying fake 
profiles as fake profiles than it is in identifying legitimate profiles as legitimate profiles, which 
matches with our use case scenario as described earlier.  
 
Feature Feature count Feature average Feature Weight 
No_Languages 15 0.135 0.037 
Profile_summary 21 0.525 0.239 
No_edu_qualifications 30 0.275 0.2 
No_connections 39 0.741 0.741 
No_recommendation 23 0.101 0.052 
Web_site_url 15 0.375 0.102 
No_Skills 30 0.389 0.283 
No_professions 34 0.283 0.24 
Profile_image 34 0.85 0.721 
No_Awards 11 0.087 0.013 
Interests 14 0.35 0.085 
No_LinkedIn_Groups 25 0.232 0.133 
No_Publications 8 0.072 0.004 
No_projects 7 0.071 0.002 
No_certificates 6 0.056 0 
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 Dataset 
Profile 
Index 
TPR TNR Accuracy 
All 
features 
Dataset 1 1.43 0.79 0.71 75.76 
Dataset 2 1.28 0.76 0.85 80.49 
Dataset 3 1.41 0.68 0.74 72.22 
Average 1.37 0.74 0.77 76.16 
Selected 
features 
Dataset 1 0.84 0.79 0.93 84.85 
Dataset 2 0.73 0.61 0.69 63.41 
Dataset 3 0.82 0.71 0.79 75.79 
Average 0.80 0.70 0.80 74.68 
Table 11:  Accuracy results obtained through Weighted Average mining 
 
5 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
One of the challenges of our research has been the collection of fake Linkedin profiles. Rather than 
relying on generated fake profiles, as has been done in past research, we rely on actual fake profiles 
reported in other sources. However, this resulted in a very small dataset, as the number of available 
verified fake profiles is not large. The small size of the dataset could lead a reader to question the 
validity of our approach. To address this concern, in this section we demonstrate the robustness of our 
approach by varying the dataset size and demonstrating the statistical significance of the result. 
Specifically, we demonstrate the robustness of our approach by demonstrating how TPR and TNR 
vary with differing training and test dataset sizes using the best-performing method we found, SVM 
with polynomial kernel using PCA-selected features. 
To demonstrate the impact of training dataset size, we randomly select part of the training dataset for 
each of the three datasets, and measure the TPR and TNR using the corresponding full test dataset for 
each of the three datasets. We vary the portion of training data from 25% to 100%, and calculated TPR 
and TNR for each training data percentage for each dataset. Figure 4 shows the average TPR and TNR 
(averaged across all three datasets) as the percentage of training dataset varies. For lower values of 
training data percentage, both the TPR and TNR are relatively low, with accuracy similar to guessing 
whether a profile is fake or legitimate. Intuitively, this makes sense – the training dataset is very small, 
so one would expect relatively low accuracy in such a scenario. As the percentage of the dataset used 
for training grows, accuracy grows as well.  However, as the training dataset size is increased beyond 
75%, both TPR and TNR stabilize. This indicates that beyond training dataset size of 75%, i.e., 28 
training profiles, having a larger training dataset would only marginally improve the performance of 
our approach.  
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Figure 4: Variation of TPR and TNR with 
training dataset size (testing dataset size = 
100%) 
 
Figure 5: Variation of TPR and TNR with testing 
dataset size (training dataset size = 100%) 
To demonstrate the stability of our results, we consider the impact of test dataset size. For each 
dataset, we build predictive models using the full-size training dataset (i.e., 37 profiles), and vary the 
percentage of test data considered from 25% to 100%. We plot how the average TPR and TNR vary 
with the percentage of test dataset tested in Figure 5. Figure 5 shows that lower percentages of test 
data considered (<=50%) provide TPR and TNR results that are not stable. However, at higher 
portions of test dataset size considered (between 75% and 100%), we see marginal differences in 
accuracy results. 
To summarize, we see an impact on accuracy results as the sizes of training and test datasets are 
varied; however, the impact is marginal at higher percentages of training and test dataset considered 
(>=75% for both training and test datasets) within the limited size of our data.  This implies that the 
addition of further data points would likely provide only marginal increases in predictive accuracy. 
 
To demonstrate that the results of our model do not significantly differ from the actual results, we have 
computed the p-values through the McNemar test. We test the null hypothesis of "marginal 
homogeneity" - “there is no difference between the model identification and actual profile types”. The 
opposite hypothesis is “there is a difference between model identification and actual profile types”. 
However, since our ultimate goal is to demonstrate that the null hypothesis is true, i.e., the opposite 
hypothesis is false; we were looking for higher p values out of our test. Table 12 declares the p-values 
for each model according to each dataset. 
 
 
 
Table 12:  p-values of legitimacy determination vs. actual profile types 
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
TPR
TNR
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
TPR
TNR
 Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 3 
Support Vector Machine 
(Polynomial Kernel) with 
PCA selected features 
0.3736 0.5050 0.2482 
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Based on the results, we can see that for SVM with Polynomial Kernel and PCA selected features, 
even at a 90% confidence level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. This implies that there is no 
significant difference in results between results of our approach and the actual profile types, and that 
our approach is significantly effective in identifying the fake profiles. 
6 DISSCUSSION 
In this research, we have compared the results of three data mining techniques to determine the most 
appropriate approach to differentiate legitimate profiles from fake profiles in LinkedIn. We first 
compare the results of our own study, comparing the accuracy of NN, SVM, and WA, both for all 
features and for only PCA-selected features.  We then consider these accuracy results in the context of 
other research in fake social network profile identification.  
Table 13 summarizes the final accuracy values for each technique as an average across all three 
datasets, as well as the average false positive rate and false negative rates for each technique.   
 
  Feature selection TPR TNR Accuracy (%) 
Neural Network 
All features 0.72 0.87 79.75 
PCA-selected features 0.78 0.91 82.83 
Support Vector Machine All features 0.83 0.90 83.23 
(Polynomial Kernel) PCA-selected features 0.87 0.94 87.34 
Weighted Average 
All features 0.74 0.77 76.16 
PCA-selected features 0.70 0.80 74.68 
Table 13:  Accuracy comparison for the three techniques NN, SVM, and WA 
In Table 13, we show only the Polynomial kernel results for the SVM case. In our scenario, the 
Polynomial kernel provides greater accuracy compared to the RBF kernel, especially for false 
negatives in the PCA-selected features case (see Table 7). Therefore, we include only Polynomial 
kernel results for comparison with the NN and WA cases.  
Based on the final accuracy rates, SVM clearly provides the highest accuracy rate among the three 
techniques, regardless of the number of features considered. However, the difference between the NN 
and SVM cases is 3.48% when all features are selected and 4.51% when only the PCA-selected 
features are considered. Based on the theoretical rationale [42, 43], SVM is preferred for the dataset 
we have, because SVM can compute results using fewer training data points than the other techniques, 
and does not suffer from local extrema. WA performs better with all features for dataset 3 (see Table 
13), however overall it does not perform well compared to NN and SVM, and we remove WA from 
consideration as a technique for fake profile detection. 
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The TPR and TNR columns show the percentages of legitimate profiles detected as legitimate and 
percentage of fake profiles detected as fake, respectively. Compared to the false positive case, false 
negatives carry a greater risk, because the costs and risks are higher when a fake profile is identified as 
legitimate, as compared to the case when a legitimate profile is identified as fake. As shown in Table 
13, SVM with selected feature has the highest TNR value (0.94). Thus, among all three approaches 
(NN, SVM and WA), SVM with polynomial kernel gives the most accurate result, with the highest true 
negative rate (TNR) for the task of fake profile identification in LinkedIn. 
Among the three techniques considered, both NN and SVM provide higher accuracy when the features 
are selected through PCA. For both datasets 1 and 2, the accuracy values for the PCA-selected features 
are greater than the case where all features are considered. Further, the false negative value is lower 
for all three techniques when only PCA-selected features are used for legitimacy prediction. Thus, the 
PCA-based feature selection step is important in the process of identifying false profiles in LinkedIn.  
From the above discussion, we conclude that PCA-based feature selection followed by SVM modelling 
with the Polynomial Kernel is the preferred approach for identifying fake profiles on LinkedIn, where 
only a limited number of profile features are publicly available.  
Next, we show how our result compares with the results of previously proposed approaches. It is 
difficult to implement and run the proposed approaches in the literature on our dataset, because 
virtually all current approaches assume that the dataset is far less limited than publicly-available 
LinkedIn data. In Table 14, we present the accuracy results reported in previous research, along with 
the social media platform on which it was applied, and a summary of the data set requirements of the 
approach. In this table, the study reporting the results is shown in the far right column.  For each study, 
an accuracy rate is provided for each combination of (1) type of features considered; (2) set of features 
considered, and (3) social network providing the data, as reported in the study.  Accuracy rates shown 
in bold are based only on static data.  All other accuracy results consider dynamic data.   
Table 14 shows accuracy rates between 60.99% and 97% for prior studies focused on fake profile 
identification, where virtually all of these studies used generated fake profiles in their experimental 
studies. In contrast, in our study here, we considered actual profiles (both fake and legitimate). Despite 
the differences in the datasets considered in this study and past research, our approach, with average 
accuracy of 87.34% and a 0.94 TNR value is on par with or superior to existing work in the area.  
In most prior studies concerned with fake profile identification, researchers considered user activities 
as an important criterion in determining the legitimacy of a profile. This includes all the dynamic 
information associated with a profile (e.g., number of posts, information about friends and their 
behaviours, etc.). In the LinkedIn case, this type of dynamic data is not publicly available due to the 
restrictive nature of the site’s privacy policies.  The sole study using only static data reports accuracy 
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rates of 60.99% to 69.25%, which is substantially lower than the accuracy rates we report in this study. 
In addition, virtually all prior studies listed in Table 14 analyzed thousands of profiles, and introduced 
simulated fake profiles into the study, rather than considering known fake profiles. In contrast, in our 
approach, we considered actual fake profiles on LinkedIn, and our approach requires only the limited 
static profile data that is publicly available for LinkedIn profiles. Considering these significant 
differences, our results of 87.34% accuracy and 0.94 TNR demonstrate that it is possible to achieve 
similar accuracy to existing approaches, using significantly less data, both in terms of profile count as 
well as features considered.   
Table 14:  Accuracy comparison for prior research on fake profile identification 
Technique used 
Accuracy 
(%) 
Feature  
Types 
Features 
Social 
network 
Source 
Principal 
Component 
Analysis + 
Support Vector 
Machine 
87.34 
Static No_Languages, Profile_Summary, 
No_Edu_Qualification, 
No_Connections, 
No_Recommendation, 
Web_Site_URL, No_Skills, 
No_Professions, Profile_Image 
No_Awards, Interests, 
No_LinkedIn_Groups, 
No_Publications, No_Projects, 
No_Certificates 
Linkedin 
(This 
research) 
Support Vector 
Machine  
78 
Dynamic 
and Static 
profile age, presence of profile 
image, followers and friends count, 
posts/messages,  details of tweets 
Twitter 
[21]. 
Naïve Bayes  67   
Random Forest 98.42 
Dynamic 
and Static 
screen name, user description, 
details of followers, details of 
tweets 
Twitter [4] 
Decision Tree 69.25 Static 
profile’s content such as age, 
gender, location 
 
[26] 
Rule Learner 66.63   
Nearest 
Neighborhood 
67.05 
 
MySpace 
Naïve Bayes 60.99   
Decision Tree 86.10 Dynamic 
profile’s connectivity, the amounts 
and types of interactions ( mutual 
friends, relationships, in/out 
degree, similarity among friends) 
 
Rule Learner 85.89   
Nearest 
Neighborhood 
84.59 
 
 
Naïve Bayes 78.03   
Twitter’s 
detection 
algorithm 
89 
Dynamic 
details of tweets and details of 
friends and followers 
Twitter [22] 
Weka Classifier: 
Decorate 
88.98 
Dynamic 
and Static user   demographics, user 
contributed content, user activities,  
user connections 
Twitter 
[23] 
Weka Classifier: 
LibSVM (SVM) 
83.09 
 
 
Weka Classifier: 
Random Forest 
algorithm 
94.5 
Dynamic number of friends, friend requests, 
details of  short text messages  
Twitter 
[24] 
97 
Dynamic notifications,  private message, 
wall posts,  and status updates  
Faceboo
k 
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7 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
One of the main limitations in this work lies in the verification of published fake profiles, as there may 
be situations where a source classifies a profile as a fake profile without proper evidence. Another 
limitation lies in the distinction among cloned profiles.  In such cases, it is difficult to determine which 
profile is the original legitimate profile, and which profiles are the fake clones generated based on it.  
Second, when a cloning attack occurs on a profile, we cannot identify which profile is legitimate, and 
which is fake.  
In future work, we intend to apply our approach to other social networks for generalizability, to 
determine whether similar accuracy levels can be attained exclusively based on limited static profile 
data. Further, we intend to delve deeper into the current study to extend our work here.  Specifically, 
we believe that SVM accuracy can be improved by further analysing the kernel, and fine-tuning the 
kernel parameters and tolerance levels [44].  
Further, in general, NN is more accurate when there are a larger number of data points, and we would 
expect better results for a larger set of profiles. We anticipate that there will be significant challenges 
in increasing the number of profiles in the study.  While it is not difficult to identify legitimate profiles, 
it is particularly challenging to increase the set of fake profiles. Finally, we plan to look more closely 
at the WA method, to see whether we can improve the WA results by combining it with another 
method, e.g., Fuzzy sets, k-nearest neighbour, or moving average. 
8 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we propose an approach to identify fake profiles in LinkedIn based on limited, static 
profile data. We considered approaches based on NN, SVM (Radial and Polynomial kernels), and WA, 
both with and without PCA feature selection for each case. Our results show that SVM with 
Polynomial Kernel using PCA-selected features provides the highest accuracy across the tested 
methods, with the lowest percentage of false negatives.  
Much of the existing research on fake profile detection assumes the availability of both dynamic and 
static data.  Further, in most of these studies, the fake profiles were simulated for analysis purposes. 
To our knowledge, this is the first research focused on identifying fake profiles in LinkedIn using only 
static profile feature data (dynamic data is not accessible in LinkedIn), and studying an experimental 
dataset that consists of both verified fake profiles as well as verified legitimate profiles. We 
demonstrate that with limited profile data, our approach can identify fake profile with 87.34% 
accuracy and a 94% True Negative Rate, which is comparable to the results obtained by other existing 
approaches based on larger data sets and significantly more varied profile information.   
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APPENDIX 
List of fake profiles with the source references 
 
 
First Name Last Name Location Industry Source 
1 Pamela May 
Holtsville, New York 
(Greater New York City 
Area) 
Human Resources http://www.dikomci.com/post/37712291401/how-to-spot-a-fake-profile-on-linkedin-and-facebook 
2 Anthony Soprano 
Greater New York City 
Area 
Gambling & Casinos http://www.integratedalliances.com/linkedin/how-to-spot-a-fake-linkedin-profile 
3 Annmarie Augustine United States  http://www.integratedalliances.com/linkedin/how-to-spot-a-fake-linkedin-profile 
4 Brittany Wilkey Holtsville, New York Human Resources http://www.dikomci.com/post/37712291401/how-to-spot-a-fake-profile-on-linkedin-and-facebook 
5 Monica Patel Holtsville, New York Human Resources http://www.dikomci.com/post/37712291401/how-to-spot-a-fake-profile-on-linkedin-and-facebook 
6 Kristin Ventura Holtsville, New York Human Resources http://www.dikomci.com/post/37712291401/how-to-spot-a-fake-profile-on-linkedin-and-facebook 
7 Christine Curtiss Holtsville, New York Human Resources http://www.dikomci.com/post/37712291401/how-to-spot-a-fake-profile-on-linkedin-and-facebook 
8 Simryn Grewal Holtsville, New York Human Resources http://www.dikomci.com/post/37712291401/how-to-spot-a-fake-profile-on-linkedin-and-facebook 
9 
Karen Simms 
LION I Accept 
Inv.,karen_simms
@journalist.com 
Professional Phoenix, Arizona Area Banking 
http://kschang.hubpages.com/hub/How-to-spot-fake-profiles-on-LinkedIn-and-other-social-networking-sites 
 
10 Robin Sage Norfolk, Virginia 
Compter & Network 
Security 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9179507/Fake_i_femme_fatale_i_shows_social_network_risks?pag
eNumber=1 
11 Jessica Trot Iran Accounting http://kschang.hubpages.com/hub/How-to-spot-fake-profiles-on-LinkedIn-and-other-social-networking-sites# 
12 cherry cole United Kingdom Capital Markets 
http://kschang.hubpages.com/hub/How-to-spot-fake-profiles-on-LinkedIn-and-other-social-networking-
sites#slide4941142 
13 Bonny Andrew Canada Chemicals http://kschang.hubpages.com/hub/How-to-spot-fake-profiles-on-LinkedIn-and-other-social-networking-sites# 
14 Danielle Baker 
Greater New York City 
Area 
Pharmaceuticals http://booleanblackbelt.com/2013/03/linkedin-catfish-fake-profiles-real-people-or-fake-photos/ 
15 Elizabeth Rose San Francisco Bay Area Oil & Energy http://booleanblackbelt.com/2013/03/linkedin-catfish-fake-profiles-real-people-or-fake-photos/ 
16 Elizabeth Obrien 
Scottsdale, Arizona 
(Phoenix, Arizona Area) 
Internet http://booleanblackbelt.com/2013/03/linkedin-catfish-fake-profiles-real-people-or-fake-photos/ 
17 Lola Bader United States  http://booleanblackbelt.com/2013/03/linkedin-catfish-fake-profiles-real-people-or-fake-photos/ 
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18 J Walter Thompson 
Pittsfield, Massachusetts 
Area 
Marketing and 
Advertising 
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.442669819090199.107405.236195939737589&type=3 
19 Kathy Hill 
Palo Alto, California (San 
Francisco Bay Area) 
Computer 
Networking 
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.442669819090199.107405.236195939737589&type=3 
20 Tessy Donna Senegal no https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.442669819090199.107405.236195939737589&type=3 
21 Sulaiman Al Fahim Dubuque, Iowa Area Real Estate http://linkedin-superstar.com/ 
22 Angelina Jolie San Francisco Bay Area Entertainment http://linkedin-superstar.com/ 
23 Akilina Stalin 
Nashua, New Hampshire 
(Greater Boston Area) 
Marketing and 
Advertising 
http://www.slideshare.net/augustinefou/fake-profiles-on-linkedin 
24 April Pierce Fresno, California Area 
Information 
Technology and 
Services 
http://www.slideshare.net/augustinefou/fake-profiles-on-linkedin 
25 Lura Burlingame Tucson, Arizona Area 
Hospital & Health 
Care 
http://www.slideshare.net/augustinefou/fake-profiles-on-linkedin 
26 Sandra Morgan 
Greater New Orleans 
Area 
Animation http://www.slideshare.net/augustinefou/fake-profiles-on-linkedin 
27 Barbie Jolly 
Yakima, Washington , 
Amerika Serikat 
Pharmaceuticals http://www.slideshare.net/augustinefou/fake-profiles-on-linkedin 
28 Susan Wall 
San Francisco Bay , 
Amerika Serikat 
Computer 
Networking 
http://www.slideshare.net/augustinefou/fake-profiles-on-linkedin 
29 Vera Knight Greater San Diego Area Facilities Services http://www.slideshare.net/augustinefou/fake-profiles-on-linkedin 
30 Lorraine Hollingsworth 
Charlotte, North Carolina 
Area 
Alternative Medicine http://www.slideshare.net/augustinefou/fake-profiles-on-linkedin 
31 Laura Hayes 
Sacramento, California 
(Sacramento, California 
Area) 
Information 
Technology and 
Services 
http://www.slideshare.net/augustinefou/fake-profiles-on-linkedin 
32 Jack bauer 
Copenhagen Area, 
Denmark 
Design http://blog.mxlab.eu/2009/04/15/wordpress-comments-lead-to-fake-company-profiles-on-linkedin/ 
33 mavis gwenda Phoenix, Arizona Area 
Health, Wellness and 
Fitness 
http://www.globalrecruitingroundtable.com/2012/08/06/identifying-fake-linkedin-members/#.UjzZ2D-
NBSM 
34 Larry Willeam 
Young America, 
Minnesota (Greater 
Minneapolis-St. Paul 
Area) 
Oil & Energy http://www.debbie-carr.com/linked-in-has-a-fair-share-of-scammers-and-fake-profiles-too/ 
 
